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I. INTRODUCTION
Parties choose to arbitrate, rather than litigate, their disputes for
myriad reasons. One reason commonly cited is the benefit of finality.1
Presumably, parties choose to arbitrate claims rather than litigate them in
an effort to resolve their dispute outside of a courtroom, thus turning to
an alternative method of dispute resolution. As an alternative, many of
these parties arbitrate in the hopes of avoiding the lengthy appellate
process and other delays often associated with traditional litigation.2
1

See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 210 (4th ed. 2003) (“The courts will nearly always
respect a provision that the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding. This serves to
discourage appeals to the courts and to make provisions for finality meaningful.”); see
also, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy
Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91, 93 (2000)
(“Finality of arbitration awards is one of the substantial virtues of the arbitral system.”);
Paul J. Krause, Disregarding Manifest Disregard: Watts Shifts Standard for Vacating
Arbitrators’ Decisions, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 79, 79 (2005) (“Arbitration can offer
advantages over traditional litigation, including speed, economy, finality, confidentiality,
flexibility, arbitrator expertise and neutrality of forum.”); Paul Bennett Marrow, A
Practical Approach to Affording Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an
Appellate Arbitrator, 60-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 10, 12 (2005) (recognizing the finality of
awards is a “clear benefit” of arbitration); Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining
Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 153 (2002)
(“State legislators seemed to recognize that the benefits of arbitration flow from its
finality” and have passed legislation providing only limited judicial review of arbitral
awards); Jennifer M. Rhodes, Comment, Judicial Review of Partial Awards Under
Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 663, 668 (2003) (“In
an effort to promote arbitration, the FAA purposefully limits the ability of courts to
review arbitral awards. The less involved the courts are in the process, the more parties
will see arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation.”).
Not only do commentators tout the benefits of finality but also courts recognize
this virtue of arbitration as well. See, e.g., Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,
935 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Contractually expanded standards [of judicial review], particularly
those that allow for factual review, clearly threaten to undermine the independence of the
arbitration process and dilute the finality of arbitration awards because, in order for
arbitration awards to be effective, courts must not only enforce the agreements to
arbitrate but also enforce the resulting arbitration awards.”); see also Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing “finality and judicial
efficiency” as benefits of arbitration); St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Delfino, 414 F.3d
882, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the court is “mindful of the strong federal policy
favoring certainty and finality in arbitration”); Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, 980 F.
Supp. 752, 760 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Deference to arbitration awards serves to promote the
benefits of . . . arbitration—speed, flexibility, informality and finality.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
2
See Todd B. Carver, ADR—A Competitive Imperative for Business, 59-OCT DISP.
RESOL. J. 67, 71 (2004) (“Both federal and state laws strictly limit the grounds upon
which arbitration awards can be challenged, thus deterring (and avoiding the expense and
other burdens of) frivolous or wasteful appeals.”); Merryn B. DeBenedetti, Note, Show
Me the Money?: Washington Adopts the Cost Prohibitive Defense to Arbitration Clauses
in Consumer Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 899, 930 (2004) (“‘Washington’s policy
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Finality would, indeed, be a great virtue of arbitration—provided the
parties could be assured the arbitrator will always make the right
decision. However, arbitrators—as with all other decision-makers—are
not infallible, and they do make mistakes. Yet the structure of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) favors finality over correct decision-making by
imposing stringent standards of review of arbitral awards.3
The limited review available under the FAA4 has caused some
parties to enter arbitration with hesitation,5 especially if the claims to be
arbitrated are complex.6 In response to the fears that the arbitrator will
favoring arbitration is grounded on the proposition that arbitration allows litigants to
avoid the formalities, expense, and delays inherent in the court system.’”) (quoting
Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 604 (Wash. 2002)); Jeremy Delibero,
Note, Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels and the Webcasting Controversy: The
Antithesis of Good Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 83, 109
(2005) (“The whole purpose of arbitration is to avoid the courtroom and all the negatives
that follow . . . .”).
3
See infra Section II.
4
See infra Section II.
5
See Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle,
38 GA. L. REV. 1145, 1204 n.285 (2004) (“The benefit of the bargain for expedient
adjudication carries with it the prospect that expectations of procedural and substantive
fairness will be frustrated, without the possibility of further recourse, when the
arbitrators’ adjudicatory conduct is disappointing or unprofessional.”) (quoting THOMAS
E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 4
(2d ed. 2000)); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 172 (2003) (“In recent years, there has been ‘growing
concern’ about the ‘risks presented by arbitration’s limited scope of review.’”) (citation
omitted); Jared S. Gross, In Search of Wiley: Struggling to Bind Successor Corporations
to Their Predecessor’s Collective Bargaining Agreement, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 113,
118 n.34 (2004) (“The finality of the arbitrator’s ruling belies much of the benefits of
arbitration, and as long as the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the contract, a
reviewing court will not overturn [the] result.”) (citations omitted); Marrow, supra note
1, at 12 (noting some attorneys may be hesitant to recommend arbitration as an
alternative to their clients because of the risk that the arbitrator may incorrectly apply the
law in the case at hand or otherwise decide the case wrongly); Noah Rubins, “Manifest
Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 363, 363 (2001) (“Parties will likely be wary of a regime that completely
eliminates judicial review, because they need assurance that such serious procedural
defects as fraud on the arbitrators, excess of powers, or improper constitution of the
tribunal will be corrected.”).
6
See Eric Van Ginkel, “Expanded” Judicial Review Revisited: Kyocera Overturns
LaPine, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 47, 53 (2003) (recognizing “the tension that exists
between the benefit of the finality of the award and the perceived absence of much
needed quality control over arbitrators as they are asked to interpret increasingly more
complex legal issues”).
Part of the problems stem from the fact that the FAA was enacted in 1925 and has
remained relatively unchanged over the past eight decades. There is no evidence
Congress imagined, much less prepared for, the widespread use of arbitration in
employment and consumer claims involving issues of statutory construction. See
Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: The
Enforceability of Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards,
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incorrectly decide certain issues of law or fact, parties have begun to
include standards of review within their agreement to arbitrate. For
example, an agreement to arbitrate may attempt to order a district court
to vacate any award not supported by “substantial evidence” or including
faulty “conclusions of law.”7 Although “state courts have generally
refused to enforce contractual provisions expanding the scope of
review,”8 parties have had significantly more luck in convincing federal
appellate courts to abide by privately selected standards of heightened
judicial review.9 However, because not all circuits enforce the parties’
desired standard of review,10 there exists a split among the circuits as to
the treatment of these clauses. A common thread in these cases deals
with parties trying to dictate to the courts the proper standard of review,
rather than detailing to the arbitrator the scope of his or her powers
under the contract.
This Article will begin by examining the text of the FAA to
determine the exact nature of arbitral review.11 It will also examine some
judicially-created standards of review which have surfaced as a result of
the limited textual bases for review.12 The Article will then delve into the
reasons why expanded judicial review may be beneficial to parties, as
well as reasons parties may wish to confine review to the standards set
forth in the FAA.13 Because the issue of expanded judicial review is
essentially one concerning the parties’ right to contract, an examination

18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 151, 193-94 (2005) (noting employment and statutory
claims have only been found arbitrable by the Supreme Court within the past three
decades). Even as arbitration remains viable within commercial industries, the changing
nature of the claims brought before arbitrators has also created a strain on some decisionmakers. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1242 (2000) (“Today,
arbitrators often are not considered experts in the subject matter of the dispute they
arbitrate because many disputes involve statutory and legal claims rather than claims that
can be resolved by examining industry customs.”).
7
In Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 990-91
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the parties’ agreement required the arbitrator to “issue a written
award which shall state the bases of the award and include detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law,” and the agreement further instructed the district court to “vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal
Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.”
The Kyocera case will be discussed in more detail in Section V.B.2.
8
Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., No. GD04-015418, 2005 WL
1595280, at *26 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 2, 2005).
9
See infra Section V.A.
10
See infra Section V.B.
11
See infra Section II.
12
See infra Section II.C.
13
See infra Section III.
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of two seminal Supreme Court cases14 impacting the decisions of the
circuit courts is warranted.15 As much of the current law deals with the
parties’ ability to tell the courts how to review their individual
arbitrations, this Article suggests the possibility that more careful
instructions to the arbitrator could perhaps lead to increased judicial
review under the FAA.16 However, the willingness of the federal courts
to embrace this approach may depend on the instructions given to the
arbitrator and how much those instructions appear to be an “end run”
around existing circuit precedent.17 Ultimately, this Article suggests
giving more detailed instructions to the arbitrator—not the courts—
should increase judicial review without infringing on Article III courts.18
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE FAA
The Federal Arbitration Act accomplishes three important tasks not
available before its passage: 1) it sought to reverse the long-standing
judicial hostility towards agreements to arbitrate;19 2) it placed
agreements to arbitrate on equal footing with all other contracts;20 and 3)
by enforcing agreements to arbitrate, Congress recognized the benefits
involved in the efficient disposition of disputes outside of the court
system.21 As such, the provisions of the FAA deal largely with issues on

14

These two cases are Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), and Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). These cases will be discussed infra Section IV.
15
See infra Section V.
16
See infra Section VI.
17
See infra Section VII.
18
This Article is limited to the attempts by parties to expand judicial review. Thus,
the question of whether the parties can further limit the court’s ability to review an award
is beyond the scope of this work. However, note 225 briefly addresses why the
recommendation set forth in this Article can only serve to expand, rather than limit,
judicial review or arbitral awards.
19
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“The
legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate.”); see also Sarah Rudolph
Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
320 (Michael L. Mofitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds. 2005); William F. Kolakowski III,
Note, The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better
Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2171, 2187 (1995).
20
See Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 160-61 (“Congress’ specific intent in
enacting the FAA was to guarantee judicial enforcement of private agreements.”);
Kolakowski, supra note 19, at 2187. The very text of the FAA states agreements to
arbitrate would become “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
21
Kolakowski, supra note 19, at 2187-88 (citing legislative history of the FAA); see
also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-80 (1989)
(recognizing the FAA “strongly favors the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate as a
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the “front end” and “back end” of arbitration, with few provisions
governing the arbitration itself.22 Accordingly, the courts are only
involved in an arbitration at these two points—either determining
whether the case should be arbitrated (also known as arbitrability) and
determining whether the award rendered should stand.23
Three provisions essentially deal with court involvement with
arbitration awards. Under Section 9 of the FAA, the parties can have
their award confirmed, i.e., transformed into an order of the court.24
According to Section 9, the award will be confirmed by a court, provided
it is not “vacated, modified, or corrected” pursuant to Sections 10 and 11
of the FAA.25 Section 10 of the FAA allows the courts to review and
vacate arbitration awards under very specific circumstances,26 and
Section 11 allows the courts to modify arbitration awards under equally
specific circumstances.27 The federal courts, however, have created
common law allowing for a slightly broader standard of review, perhaps
because the statutory review is so limited.28 While the circuits have
developed different names for this new standard of review, it is most
means of securing prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
22
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); see also Maggio & Bales, supra
note 6, at 162-63 (discussing the provisions of the FAA).
23
Cole & Blankley, supra note 19, at 322. According to Cole and Blankley:
Under the FAA, court involvement occurs, if at all, in two situations: prior
to the start of arbitration and after the completion of arbitration. First,
pursuant to the FAA, a party with a valid arbitration agreement may obtain a
stay of litigation from a court where the arbitration proceeds. . . . Second,
the FAA enables enforcement of an arbitration agreement by authorizing a
party to an arbitration agreement to file in federal district court a motion to
compel the party to arbitrate. . . . The FAA also contains provisions for
limited judicial review of arbitration awards, together with provisions
articulating the process for vacation or modification of arbitral awards.
Id.
24
9 U.S.C. § 9. This section provides: “If the parties in their agreement have agreed
that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
arbitration, [the parties] . . . may apply to the court . . . for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified,
or corrected.” Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. § 10(a); see also Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an
Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 764 (2004) (“[C]ontemporary arbitration
law is characterized by a highly deferential standard of review. Once an arbitration award
has been issued, only limited grounds for challenge are available.”).
27
9 U.S.C. § 11.
28
In discussing the review of arbitration awards, the Sixth Circuit has noted, “A
court’s review of an arbitration award [under the FAA] ‘is one of the narrowest standards
of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence.’” Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers
Local No. 164, 363 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn.
Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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commonly referred to as review for “manifest disregard of the law.”29
These two sections of the FAA and the judicially-created standards of
review will be discussed in more detail below.
A. FAA Section 10 — Vacatur of Arbitral Awards
Section 10 of the FAA is usually cited as the standard for judicial
review of arbitration awards. However, the text of the statute does not
speak to judicial review or a standard, such as de novo review, under
which the courts should examine the resulting award. Instead, this
section allows the courts to vacate an award, provided the circumstances
leading up to the award meet enumerated criteria. Under Section 10, the
court can vacate an award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.30

None of the first three of these grounds for vacatur even address the
merits of the case; they only look to the actions of the arbitrator and the
parties to determine whether the procedure was fair.31 Even when the
29

Goldberg, supra note 1, at 274. Goldberg notes that the “circuit courts have
adopted nonstatutory grounds, such as ‘manifest disregard of the law,’ to review
arbitration decisions. Other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur include that the award was:
completely irrational, in direct conflict with public policy, arbitrary and capricious, or
inconsistent with the essence of the parties’ underlying contract.” Id. (citation omitted).
30
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
31
See Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and
Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 521, 544
(2000) (“The first three of those statutory standards sanction vacatur of awards for certain
types of party, advocate, and/or arbitrator misconduct or misbehavior that can taint the
arbitration proceeding and prejudice the rights of a party.”); Stephen P. Younger,
Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 241, 243-44 (1999) (“The first three of these grounds are essentially procedural in
nature: their concern is not with the context or merit of the award, but with the means
used by the arbitrators (and, in the case of Section 10(a)(1), the parties) in reaching the
award.”).
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court reviews to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers
bestowed upon him or her, the court does not examine the merits of any
of the issues, properly or improperly heard.32
Plainly missing from this statute is review over whether the
decision was correctly decided. The Seventh Circuit has explicitly noted
that it is “forbidden to substitute its own interpretation [of an agreement
to arbitrate] even if [it is] convinced that the arbitrator’s interpretation
[is] not only wrong, but plainly wrong.”33 Even if the arbitrator
committed serious errors of law or misapplied the facts, the reviewing
courts will only rarely overturn an award. The Supreme Court has held,
“[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision.”34 While such deferential review may be unsettling, there is no
indication that the courts or Congress are willing to create a greater
standard of review. In fact, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law, in drafting the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(“RUAA”), recommended the states enact a provision almost identical to
Section 10 of the FAA.35 Thus, expanded judicial review of the merits of
the arbitration award, if possible at all, must be premised on a legal
theory other than the vacatur section of the FAA.
32

Younger, supra note 31, at 243-44 (“Section 10(a) does address the substance of
the award, but in a somewhat oblique fashion. Pursuant to this provision, courts may
strike down awards when the arbitrators decided issues not submitted to them or grant
relief not authorized by the parties. However, where the subject matter or remedy is
deemed within the arbitrator’s authority, a reviewing court will generally not secondguess the merits of the arbitrator’s decision.”).
33
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
34
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
35
REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a) (2000). Under the RUAA, vacatur is
warranted in the following circumstances: 1) “the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means;” 2) “evident partiality” on the part of an arbitrator or
arbitrator misconduct; 3) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing, thus causing
substantial prejudice to one party; 4) “the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers;” 5)
the parties did not have a valid agreement to arbitrate; or 6) the hearing was conducted
without giving sufficient notice to a party. Id.
The drafters considered, but specifically rejected, the possibility of opting into a
broader standard of judicial review. The drafters refused to include this optional standard
of judicial review for the following reasons: “(1) the current uncertainty as to the legality
of a state statutory sanction of the ‘opt-in’ device, (2) the ‘disconnect’ between the Act’s
purpose of fostering the use of arbitration as a final and binding alternative to traditional
litigation in a court of law, and (3) the inclusion of a statutory provision that would
permit the parties to contractually render arbitration decidedly non-final and nonbinding.” REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note. As an alternative, the
RUAA suggests the parties could simply include in their agreement to arbitrate the use of
an arbitral appellate panel. Id.
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B. FAA Section 11 — Modification of Arbitral Awards
While Section 10 of the FAA allows for the complete vacatur of an
award, under Section 11, other types of errors can be corrected, and some
awards modified, provided the parties can show the circumstances
surrounding their award meet specific criteria.36 The statute provides
three grounds under which the award may be corrected or modified.
First, the court can change an award “where there was an evident
material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.”37
Second, the court can modify an award “[w]here the arbitrators have
awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not
affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.”38 Finally,
the court is free to change an award that is “imperfect in matter of form
not affecting the merits of the controversy.”39 The purpose of these
provisions is to allow the court to modify or correct an award “so as to
effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.”40 As
with the section on vacatur, the RUAA contains a provision almost
identical to FAA Section 11.41
This section regarding correction or modification of awards is
relatively uncontroversial. As with the section on vacatur, this provision
contains only the most limited reasons for court interference with an
arbitration award. Both of these provisions evidence Congress’s intent to
enforce agreements to arbitrate according to the terms the parties have

36
See Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, Arbitration Clauses Should Be Enforced According
to Their Terms—Except When They Shouldn’t Be: The Ninth Circuit Limits Parties’
Ability to Contract for Standards of Review of Arbitration Awards, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL.
461, 464 (“Similarly, section 11 of the FAA permits modification of arbitral awards in
only three narrow situations.”).
37
9 U.S.C. § 11(a) (2000).
38
9 U.S.C. § 11(b). This grounds for modification is quite similar to the “exceeding
powers” grounds for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). In both situations, the award will
be reviewed to determine if the arbitrator ruled upon an issue not properly before him or
her. Presumably, the same grounds for review is mentioned in both sections because
Section 10 and Section 11 offer different remedies. If the party challenging the award
hopes the court will vacate it in its entirely, it would seek review under Section 10;
however, if the same party only wishes to have the award modified to eliminate the
portions dealing with matters not properly before the arbitrator, such could be
accomplished by making a motion to the court under Section 11(b).
39
Id. § 11(c).
40
Id. § 11.
41
REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 24(a) (allowing modification or correction
of an award on the basis of: miscalculation or improper description, an arbitrator deciding
issues not properly before him or her, or correcting imperfections in the award not
affecting the merits of the decision).
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set forth for themselves.42 By allowing review primarily to determine
whether the arbitrator performed his or her duties as specified under the
contract, the courts preserve the principle of freedom of contract. These
two review provisions demonstrate the importance of careful drafting of
arbitration agreements and beg the question of whether courts will more
carefully review or scrutinize the decision of an arbitrator who has been
given very specific powers and instructions through a meticulously
drafted agreement to arbitrate.
C. “Manifest Disregard” and Other Standards — Creatures of Federal
Common Law
For reasons never explicitly stated in their opinions,43 the federal
courts have allowed a limited expanded judicial review under a variety of
different titles. The authority for expanding judicial review is grounded
in dicta from the case Wilko v. Swan.44 In Wilko, the Supreme Court
noted, “Power to vacate an award is limited. . . . In unrestricted
submissions [of cases to arbitration], the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to the manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to review for error in interpretation.”45 More than four
decades later, the Supreme Court noted a “party still can ask a court to
review the arbitrator’s decision, but the court will set that decision aside
only in very unusual circumstances.”46 After citing FAA Section 10, the
Court cited Wilko for the proposition that “parties bound by arbitrator’s
decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law” would be upheld on
review.47 Thus, the Supreme Court appears to have paved the way for
judicially-created expanded review of arbitration awards.
42
As the Supreme Court noted in Volt, the intent of the contracting parties is
paramount because “[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.” Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989). See also Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 27
(1st Cir. 2005) (“Passage of the FAA ‘was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered.’”) (quoting
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
43
Presumably, the courts feel constrained by the limited nature of statutory review.
See Milana Koptsiovsky, Note, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitration
Award: Does Freedom of Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements?, 36 CONN. L. REV.
609, 615 (2004) (“Because the four instances addressed by § 10 are limited, the courts
have created two additional grounds for vacatur: manifest disregard of the law and public
policy.”).
44
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
45
Id. at 436.
46
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
47
Id. In 1989, the Supreme Court overruled Wilko v. Swan. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 477 (1989). Thus, when the First Options
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Although most reviewing courts employ the “manifest disregard of
the law” standard, this nomenclature is hardly universal.48 No matter the
title given to the standard of review, even this “expanded” review is still
quite limited. One common definition of the “manifest disregard” inquiry
asks whether “the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing
law and then proceeded to ignore it.”49 Although the “manifest
disregard” standard would allow courts to correct some errors of law, the
review is strict and a “mere mistake of law by an arbitrator cannot serve
as the basis for judicial review.”50 Because this standard of review
requires one party to show the arbitrator both knew the applicable law
and then refused to apply it, the party seeking review will often have
difficulty in meeting its burden of proof. In Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Brothers, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit refused to vacate an arbitral award
for manifest disregard of the law despite evidence one party encouraged
the arbitrator to rule on the basis of equity, rather than strictly following
the law.51 Yet despite the urgings of one party, the court found no
manifest disregard of the law because there was “nothing in the award or
elsewhere in the record to indicate” the arbitrators heeded the party’s
plea to disregard the law and decide the case on equitable grounds.52
Rulings in cases such as Montes demonstrate just how limited this
“expanded” review actually is in practice. Proving the arbitrator was both
aware of governing law and intended to ignore it will be difficult even in

Court cited to it favorably, it resurrected the legitimacy of the “manifest disregard”
standard.
48
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
49
Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159,
309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002)); see also Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg.
Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting the “manifest disregard” standard “implies
that the arbitrators appreciated the existence of a governing legal rule but willfully
decided not to apply it”) (citation omitted).
50
Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 427 F.3d at 32 (citing Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner,
72 F.3d 234, 239 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995).
51
128 F.3d 1456, 1459 (11th Cir. 1997). Specifically, the attorney for Shearson
urged the arbitrator: “I know, as I have served many times as an arbitrator, that you as an
arbitrator are not guided strictly to follow case precedent. That you can also do what’s
fair and just and equitable and that is what Shearson is asking of you in this case.” Id.
During closing arguments, the attorney again urged the arbitrator to follow the equities of
the case, rather than the stricture of case law, and stated: “The law says one thing. What
equity demands and requires and is saying is another. What is right and fair and proper
about this? You know as arbitrators you have the ability, you are not strictly bound by
case law and precedent. You have the ability to do what is right, what is fair and what is
proper, and that’s what Shearson is asking you to do.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
52
Id. at 1461.
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cases involving the most meticulous records.53 Additionally, a party
could only hope to prove “manifest disregard” by pointing to portions of
a written, reasoned award, outlining the arbitrator’s knowledge of the
law and the arbitrator’s decision to disregard it. Without such a written
opinion, review under this standard may well be impossible.54
Although the “manifest disregard” standard is employed in most, if
not all, circuits, additional grounds for review have also been created.55
Some courts will also vacate an award if that award is “completely
irrational,” meaning the award “fails to draw its essence from the
agreement.”56 The Eighth Circuit will uphold an agreement under this
standard of review if it determines “the award is derived from the
agreement, viewed in light of the agreement’s language and context, as
well as other indications of the parties’ intention.”57 However, despite its
new name, the review for “complete irrationality” may actually be a
review under FAA Section 10(a)(4) to determine if the arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers under the agreement.58

53
See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text for a discussion as to the financial
ramifications for expanded judicial review, such as the additional costs of transcripts and
increased arbitrator costs for issuing written opinions.
54
The First Circuit has held, as “arbitrators need not explain their award, and did not
do so here, it is no wonder appellant is hard pressed to satisfy the exacting criteria for
invocation of the [‘manifest disregard’] doctrine.” Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6,
10 (1st Cir. 1990). With respect to review of an award without written reasoning, the
Second Circuit recently noted:
Absent an explanation [for the award], the reviewing court must attempt to
infer from the record whether the arbitrators appreciated and ignored a
clearly governing legal principle. The arbitration decision must be
confirmed if there is any basis for upholding the decision and [i]f there is
even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached.
Bear, Sterns & Co., Inc. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted). Although no written arbitration award is required, the presence of a
well-reasoned award as well as a transcript of the arbitration proceedings would
significantly aid the party seeking vacatur.
55
The review available in each circuit is different, and the standards of review are
not consistent from circuit to circuit. See Barabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376
F.3d 377, 382 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (outlining which circuits utilize the following standards
of review: arbitrary and capricious; completely irrational; violation of public policy;
denial of fundamentally fair hearing; and modified versions of manifest disregard).
56
Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Paper Allied-Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159,
309 F.3d at 1080); see also U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of Cal., No. 05-55588,
2005 WL 3150272, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
57
McGrann v. First Albany Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2005).
58
In Brabham, 376 F.3d at 382 n.6, the Third Circuit suggests this review is “simply
a subset of a statutory ground for vacatur,” i.e., review for whether the arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers.
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The Eleventh Circuit stands alone in allowing review of an
arbitrator’s award under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The
“arbitrary and capricious” standard asks whether the grounds “for the
arbitrator’s decision can[] be inferred from the facts of the case.”59
Although this review appears to be more searching because it examines
not only the law of the case but also the underlying facts, the court is
mindful that the standard review is “very difficult” to meet, especially in
light of the fact that “the award is presumptively correct.”60 Whether this
review is a viable alternative to the FAA remains to be seen, especially
because three circuits have rejected it, albeit implicitly.61 Finally, some
circuits allow review of an award to determine if the award violates
notions of public policy.62
The presence of so many federally created standards of judicial
review evidences the circuit courts’ dissatisfaction with the review
available under the FAA. However, even these “expanded” forms of
review are quite limited as the courts appear to be wary of chipping too
far away from the statutory standards of review.63 Although the courts
are split as to whether they honor party-dictated standards of review,64
59

Lifecare Int’l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. The Eleventh Circuit will also review an arbitration award under the “manifest
disregard” standard. See B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., No. 05-11153,
2006 WL 462368, at *5 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2006). Review under the “manifest disregard”
standard is also difficult, and to date only one arbitration award was vacated under this
standard. Id. (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir.
1997)).
61
Brabham, 376 F.3d at 382 n.6.
62
Ace Elec. Contractors v. Int’l Bros. of Elec. Workers, 414 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir.
2005) (allowing review for violations of public policy even if the award “draws its
essence” from the collective bargaining agreement); Paper Allied-Indus. Chem. v.
Sandvik Special Metals Corp., 132 F. App’x 149, 150 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging an
“extremely narrow” review for violations of public policy); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy,
Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Besides the four statutory grounds, manifest
disregard and contrary to public policy are the only nonstatutory bases recognized by this
circuit for vacatur of an arbitration award.”); Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No.
164, 363 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing a very limited review of awards for
violation of public policy but noting that the courts do “not possess a broad power to set
aside an arbitration award as against public policy”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Review for violations of public policy most often surface in the employment
context under a collective bargaining agreement. These cases usually involve an
arbitrator’s decision to reinstate an employee who has engaged in nefarious behavior such
as sexually harassing a co-worker or being a transportation worker who has tested
positive for use of controlled substances. See Way Bakery, 363 F.3d at 595-96 (citing
cases).
63
See Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 166 (“Although the net result of these
safeguards is that the arbitrators must grant a fundamentally fair hearing to all parties, the
standards for vacatur are invariably high.”) (footnote omitted).
64
See infra Section V.
60
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perhaps working with the statutory and common law standards of review
will ensure greater review. Under the case law one thing is clear: the
greater discretion given to the arbitrator, the more likely the decision of
the arbitrator will be found to be made within that discretion. Thus, by
specifically dictating the terms of arbitration in the initial agreement,
parties may have greater success in trying to either vacate or modify the
resulting award if the appointed arbitrator fails to abide by the terms of
his or her contract.65
III. EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW — DO THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGH
COSTS?
Given the limited review available under the plain language of the
FAA and the only slightly more expansive additional federal grounds
under which courts can review arbitration awards, parties have attempted
to write into their contract additional grounds under which courts can
review resulting awards.66 Whether or not the courts will ultimately abide
by the terms of the contract, parties should seriously consider the
advantages and disadvantages of expanded judicial review. At its most
basic level, some people may be drawn to the idea of finality while
others may yearn for a more searching review.67 Even beyond finality,
parties may wish to consider other aspects of increased judicial review,
such as increased costs, time, and the possibility of encroaching on the
province of the judiciary, before crafting an arbitration agreement
purporting to give the courts de novo—or other—review over the
arbitrator’s award.
A. The Potential Benefits of Expanded Review
The most obvious reason parties would like to expand judicial
review is to correct arbitration decisions that are plainly wrong.68 As
65

See infra Section VI.A.
See infra Section V.
67
As noted by Di Jiang-Schuerger, “finality of an arbitral award may be either a
benefit or a drawback of arbitration, depending on the parties’ interests. Some parties
may appreciate a fast and final decision, while others would rather have the assurance
that any possible legal or factual mistakes can be brought to a court for correction.” Di
Jiang-Schuerger, Note, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?, 4 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 231, 246 (1999); see also Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 155 (“Parties
attracted to the speed, efficiency and economy of the arbitration process are often
disturbed about the finality of the decision.”).
68
Recall, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held it could not overturn an arbitration
award simply because it was “plainly wrong.” Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Margaret Moses,
Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52
U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 429 (2004) (“Because an arbitration award is not easily overturned,
66
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noted above,69 the limited review offered under the plain language of the
FAA and the federal common law may be unsatisfying. Indeed, no party
should hope to challenge an arbitral award only to have the court explain:
“In contracting for arbitration of disputes . . . the parties bargained for a
decision by the arbitrator, not necessarily a good one, and that is what
they received.”70 Certainly the parties do not enter arbitration hoping for
or even expecting a mediocre performance by the decision-maker. Thus,
parties may understandably contract for increased judicial review as a
means of achieving greater control over the quality of the arbitrator.71
Even if increased judicial review is not meant to improve the quality of
the arbitration or ensure proper reasoning in the award, some parties may
be drawn to this concept as a means of “hedging their bets” or trying to
obtain a second bite of the proverbial apple.72
While some parties may be concerned that the arbitrator may arrive
at the wrong decision by incorrectly applying the law, other parties may
be concerned about arbitrator bias not significant enough to warrant
vacatur under FAA Section 10.73 Bias may be most evident in situations
involving arbitration between an institutional party, usually a “repeat
player,” and a “one shot” party such as a consumer or an employee. The
institutional “repeat player,” by virtue of its repeated dealings with the
arbitral process, “may develop informal relationships with the arbitrator,
creating an incentive for the arbitrator to find in its favor.”74
parties sometimes harbor fears that a maverick arbitrator will render an egregious award,
which cannot be challenged even though wrong on the facts and the law.”).
69
See supra Section II.
70
Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit went on to note, “It is not for us to second-guess [the
choices exhibited in the arbitration contract] or judicially rewrite the agreement because
one party now wishes it were different.” Id.
71
Admittedly, using increased judicial review as an arbitrator quality-control device
seems counter-intuitive. If the parties are seriously concerned about quality control, they
should expend their energy in choosing the correct decision-maker on the “front end” of
arbitration, rather than expending significant resources challenging the award on the
“back end.”
72
Maggio and Bales, however, contend there is no true “second bite of the apple”
phenomenon in the realm of expanded judicial review because both parties have the
opportunity to petition the courts for expanded review, “thereby sharing the risk and, at
the same time, ensuring the fairness of the process.” Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at
156.
73
See Cole, supra note 6, at 1243 (“[M]any parties now believe that the limited
review outlined in FAA § 10(a) creates a risk of arbitrary and capricious, or even biased
decision-making. Groups interested in reform of the arbitral process often advocate the
requirements of written opinions and expanded judicial review of those opinions as a
means to achieve the fairness they believe is currently missing from the process.”).
74
Id. at 1242. The “informal relationship” between the arbitrators and the
institutional parties is multi-faceted. On one level, the arbitrator may become familiar and
develop a friendly rapport with the attorneys and officers of the institutional party, thus
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Additionally, the “one shot” players arguably have more invested in each
individual arbitration because the institutional party, who will likely
participate in many arbitrations, can hope any losses in an individual
arbitration are evened out over the long run.75 The “one shot” player,
however, has much to lose in the event the arbitrator decided the case
wrongly or in a biased manner.76 Thus, increased judicial review could
help ensure fairness in situations involving repeat versus one-shot
players.77
Parties who wish for the courts to have a more meaningful judicial
review of their award will invariably have to require the arbitrator to
actually provide a written, reasoned award.78 Although there are some
creating the potential for a personal bias in favor of the institutional party. On another
level, the arbitrator may realize it would be more likely to be hired again and again by an
institutional party, provided the arbitrator rules favorably towards it. See also Maggio &
Bales, supra note 6, at 155 (“Concerned that the neutral [arbitrator] may in fact be biased
toward one party, especially in the employment or consumer context where arbitrators
with specialized knowledge may be well known to one of the parties who has utilized
their services in the past, or perhaps simply comfortable with the traditional judicial
litigation route of dispute resolution where one appeal is normally a matter of right,
parties have increasingly written into their arbitration contracts clauses expanding the
scope of judicial review statutorily provided.”).
75
Cole, supra note 6, at 1242-43.
76
Id.
77
Because the institutional parties possess increased bargaining power over the “one
shot” players, the ability for “one shot” players to bargain for increased review may be
limited. While increased review may ultimately benefit the employees and consumers,
the ability for those groups to effectively bargain for these terms in their agreement to
arbitrate is beyond the scope of this Article.
Conversely, at least two commentators suggest increased judicial review actually
favors the party with increased bargaining power. Michael L. LeRoy & Peter Fueille, The
Revolving Door of Justice: Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an
Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 861, 901 (2004). Under this theory, the party with
greater bargaining power and resources would be less affected by the delay associated
with judicial review. Id. Conversely, the party in the weaker position may be in more
desperate need to resolve the dispute and collect an award. See id. Additionally, the
institutional party almost always has greater financial resources and will be less affected
by the increased costs of post-arbitration litigation. Lee Goldman, too, urges against the
use of expanded-review clauses in consumer claims, in part, on the basis of increased
costs to the “one shot” player. Goldman, supra note 5, at 194.
78
See Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 166 (“Reviewing courts are further
constrained by the lack or dearth of written findings by the arbitrator.”); Lynn Katzler,
Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities
Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 151, 169 (1995) (“Without a written opinion, however, a court is unable to review
meaningfully an arbitration decision, because it is difficult to uncover potential problems
such as bias or mistake.”). At least one commentator has suggested arbitrators purposely
write terse awards in order to prevent courts from overturning their rulings on appeal.
Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443, 446-47 (1998) (“Thus, it is generally believed that in order to
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potential drawbacks to requiring arbitrators to issue reasoned awards,79
parties may feel more satisfied about the process if they know why the
arbitrator decided to rule in a particular manner.80 Additionally, the
requirement for a reasoned award could serve to encourage the arbitrator
to fully develop the reasoning behind his or her ultimate decision.81 Even
if the parties do not ultimately challenge the award in court, they should
be satisfied knowing the reasons for the award.82
Thus, contracting for increased judicial review has benefits other
than the ability to correct errors of law or fact present in an arbitral
award. The potential for increased review may ease parties’ fears and
apprehensions, guard against arbitrator bias, and give the parties the
satisfaction of knowing the reasoning behind the award issued.
B. Drawbacks of Contracting for Expanded Review
Yet despite the benefits expanded review offers, certain drawbacks
exist for parties and perhaps even the institution of arbitration. First and
foremost, Congress never intended for expanded judicial review because
arbitration was meant to be an alternative to litigation.83 Indeed, the
limited review provisions of the FAA have been described as “integral to
preclude judicial usurpation of arbitrators’ contractual authority to resolve the merits of
the controversies submitted to them, arbitrators should keep commercial awards as brief
as possible and reveal little, if any, of the analytical process leading to the result
reached.”).
79
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
80
If there is no written award, the parties “are provided no reliable indicia of whether
the arbitrator’s decision was founded on a full understanding of the material facts and a
proper interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of their contract and the
applicable law.” Hayford, supra note 78, at 447.
81
See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 137 (1997) (“Beyond facilitating review,
mandatory opinions would provide a bonus, fostering clarity of thought.”); Katzler, supra
note 78, at 191 (noting parties and arbitrators would benefit from written awards
especially when complex damages calculations are at issue).
82
See Frank E. Massengale & Karen Kaler Whitfield, Arbitration: Be Careful What
You Wish For, 44 LA. B.J. 120, 123 (1996) (“While reasoned arbitral awards may
increase exposure to judicial reversal, the absence of reasoning in awards often increases
frustration of the losing party and prompts attempts to obtain judicial reversal.”). Even if
the award provides nothing more than peace of mind for the parties, this may be more
than they receive in a one- or two-line opinion simply dictating the winner of the
controversy.
83
The very limited means of judicial review under the FAA evidences Congress’s
intent to ensure arbitration remained a viable, speedier alternative to litigation. See also
supra note 21 and accompanying text. Additionally, expanded judicial review has the
potential to “obliterate the distinction between arbitration and litigation, thereby
destroying the great advantage of arbitration, which is to provide a speedy and efficient
process for completing the adjudication of disputes in a single instance.” Moses, supra
note 68, at 434.
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the legislative policy promoting arbitration as a private, flexible,
efficient, and self-contained procedure.”84 By allowing for increased
judicial review, arbitration may serve as a mere “stepping stone” to
judicial litigation of the arbitral award, and arbitration no longer serves
as a “self-contained” procedure.85 Instead, the arbitrators are essentially
converted into district courts while the federal district courts are
converted into single-judge courts of appeals reviewing all of the awards.
Thus, increased judicial review may actually serve to transform
arbitration proceedings into nothing more than litigation where initial
fact-finding determinations are made in the private sphere thereby
reducing the efficiency of the arbitral procedure.
In a similar vein, engaging in a series of post-arbitration procedures
in court ameliorates many of the traditional benefits of arbitration:
namely the benefits of efficiency, both in terms of time and cost.
Obtaining judicial review by a federal district court, and perhaps even an
appellate court, exponentially adds to the time and cost associated with
the arbitration.86 Thus, expanded judicial review has the potential to
require the same amount of cost and time as traditional litigation, if
multiple appeals are sought.87 Perhaps if the parties calculated the
potential cost of post-arbitration litigation, those parties may decide that
they would rather take their chances in litigation, instead.88 However,
arbitration may still be appropriate for parties who do not anticipate
judicial review but would still prefer the protections expanded review
84
Schmitz, supra note 1, at 181; see also Davis, supra note 81, at 135 (noting some
commentators believe requiring “written opinions and verbatim records would heap even
more inefficiency onto the process”).
85
See Anthony J. Longo, Comment, Agreeing to Disagree: A Balanced Solution to
Whether Parties May Contract for Expanded Judicial Review Beyond the FAA, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2003) (noting some circuit courts are concerned
“contractual expansion [of judicial review] would turn arbitration into a step-ladder to
appellate litigation on the legal merits”).
86
Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 67, at 246-47 (“The FAA does not contemplate
arbitration as a preliminary step to judicial resolution. Instead, one underlying goal of the
FAA is to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative
method for dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
87
William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Shifting Attorney’s Fees in
Litigation Attacking Commercial Arbitration Awards: A Disincentive for Meritless
Motions for Correction, Modification or Vacatur, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 518 (1998) (“If
the parties agreed to submit to binding alternative dispute resolution, then such postarbitration litigation is offensive to arbitration’s goals of speed, efficiency, and costcontainment.”).
88
See Ilya Enkishev, Comment, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical
Implications of Contracting for Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61, 93 (2004)
(commenting that if the parties wish to contract for de novo review of their arbitration
award, they may be better served by simply litigating their claim in the first instance).
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would provide in the unlikely event the arbitrator incorrectly decides the
case.
Not only does increased judicial review add to the cost of
arbitration because the parties will have to pay for the additional appeals
but also the parties will have to incur costs for things such as a transcript
of the proceeding, a court reporter, and a written award in order to assure
the courts will actually have something to review on appeal.89 If the
parties are serious about the possibility of expanded judicial review, they
must have the foresight to have a court reporter present at the
proceedings and then have a transcript made to preserve the record.90 On
top of these costs, the party may also have to bear the added attorney fees
associated with submission of pre- and post-hearing briefs because the
submission of the brief may preserve issues for appeal and serve to prove
the arbitrator was aware of the existing law.91 A final additional cost is
the cost of requiring the arbitrator to write a written award.92 Because the
89

Without, at the very least, a reasoned award, the reviewing court will be left with
nothing to review under either the statutory standards of review or the federally created
nonstatutory grounds for review. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. As noted
above, see id., the courts will rarely, if ever, disturb an arbitrator’s decision simply
because it is unsupported by a reasoned award. Furthermore, without the reasoned award,
the courts are left with nothing to review, and the award will not be reversed on appeal.
90
Schmitz, supra note 1, at 183. Schmitz recognizes that the desire for expanded
judicial review “sparks a chain reaction that transforms the arbitration process. For
example, a court cannot substantively review an arbitration award without a detailed
transcript of the hearing. Therefore, the parties must bear the high costs of hiring a court
reporter and ordering transcripts.” Id.; see also Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to
Judicial Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 583, 623 (1995)
(“With the benefit of a verbatim transcript the reviewing court can evaluate in meticulous
detail whether the facts justify the award. If the parties choose to forego arranging for a
court reporter, they have manifested their intent to forego an in depth review of the
award.”).
91
Schmitz, supra note 1, at 183 (“In addition, because a reviewing court requires a
written record of legal and factual arguments presented in arbitration, parties must hire
attorneys and pay legal fees for time devoted to researching legal issues, drafting briefs
and memoranda, and building a detailed record for appeal.”).
Just as parties may be required to submit pre- and post-hearing briefs in order to
preserve arguments for appeal, the parties, too, will have to be diligent in making
objections during the course of the proceeding. Id. (“Parties anticipating appellate-type
review also must clutter and prolong arbitration proceedings with objections and offers of
proof pursuant to judicial procedural and evidentiary rules in order to preserve the
record.”). Although the cost of making objections for the record may be negligible, the
practice of preserving every possible issue for appeal could significantly lengthen the
proceedings. For parties whose attorneys charge by the hour, the additional time could
become quite costly.
92
See Kevin A. Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
509, 552 (2002) (noting effective judicial review would require “the arbitrator and parties
[to] have to make sure that an extensive record exists, which could only be accomplished
through discovery, and a written and reasoned award granted[, and t]hese requirements
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arbitrator is paid for the amount of time he or she actually spends
working on a case, the arbitrator will certainly charge the parties for the
time taken to fashion the award. Not only does a written award add to the
total cost of arbitration but also it adds to the time taken to resolve the
dispute.93 These types of costs may not be obvious, but they certainly
exist.
Because expanded judicial review has both benefits and drawbacks,
hopefully the parties will consider these various policies to determine
whether they may prosper from the additional proceedings. Perhaps the
parties may determine arbitration with increased judicial review is
actually a “middle ground” between litigation in court and traditional
arbitration.94 Perhaps increased judicial review would be appropriate if
the arbitration at issue is particularly complex.95 Indeed, the attorneys in
many complex cases would plan to submit pre- and post-hearing briefs
and engage in extensive discovery in any event, so the possibility of
expanded judicial review may not add significant time or expense for the
parties involved. In contrast, the parties to a relatively simple case could
see their expenses rise exponentially if they were truly serious about
preserving their ability to review. Thus, depending on the circumstances
of the case, increased review could benefit the parties involved. In other
words, the issue may be one of the parties’ freedom to contract, and
hopefully the parties will make this decision after being apprised of both
the benefits and drawbacks of expanded review.
IV. VOLT AND MASTROBUONO: SUPREME COURT PRECURSORS AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Because the possibility of increased judicial review may be
considered a matter relating to the parties’ freedom to contract, this
section will briefly examine the Supreme Court’s decisions in Volt96 and

would add cost” to the proceeding); Stanley McDermott, III, Expanded Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards is a Mixed Blessing that Raises Serious Questions, 5 No. 1 DISP.
RESOL. MAG. 18, 21 (1998) (stating expanded review could only be accomplished
through a “thorough and often expensive record of the arbitration proceedings, with the
added expense of the arbitrators’ time and effort to prepare a written opinion to meet
anticipated judicial scrutiny”).
93
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425,
469 (1988) (noting the issuance of written awards increases both the time to resolve the
arbitration and the time to resolve the entire controversy if the award is later appealed).
94
Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 192.
95
See McDermott, supra note 92, at 21 (“Such an opportunity [for expanded judicial
review] might be desirable in large or complex arbitrations.”).
96
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468 (1989).
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Mastrobuono,97 two seminal cases dealing with this issue. Although
neither of these cases directly speaks to the issue of judicial review, they
do speak to the parties’ right to contract and choice-of-law issues.98 The
circuit courts allowing expanded judicial review rely heavily on these
precedents,99 so an examination of these two cases will illuminate the
discussion on the right to contract for broader judicial review.
In Volt, the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of
their relationship, noting the contract “shall be governed by the law of
the place where the Project is located.”100 When a dispute arose, Volt
made a demand for arbitration, but the Board of Trustees instead filed an
action in California state court.101 The state court denied Volt’s motion to
compel arbitration, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on the
basis of a California law that allows a court to stay the arbitration in the
event “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of
law or fact.”102 In affirming the ruling below, the Supreme Court
enforced the choice-of-law provision, finding it consistent with the FAA
and the strong policy in favor of enforcing private agreements to
arbitrate.103
The Volt Court recognized “Congress’ principal purpose [in
enacting the FAA was to ensure] that private arbitration agreements are
enforced according to their terms.”104 Provided the state law chosen does
not mandate a judicial, rather than arbitral, forum for the ultimate
resolution of their dispute, the clearly worded choice-of-law provision
should be enforced and the underlying state law should not be deemed
pre-empted by the FAA.105 Because the California law at issue only
required the parties to arbitrate “under different rules than those set forth
in the [FAA],” not enforcing the agreement according to the terms of the
97

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
At first blush, the choice-of-law issue appears to have little, if anything, to do with
judicial review. However, choice-of-law becomes an important issue when parties argue
the substantive law of the chosen state actually allows for greater review than provided
under the FAA. For reasons explained in more detail below, the courts of appeals
deciding this issue have universally held a simple choice-of-law provision is not
sufficient to expand judicial review. See infra notes 146-49, 156-57 and accompanying
text.
99
See infra Section V.A.
100
489 U.S. at 470. This construction contract required Volt to perform electrical
work on the Stanford University Campus, and, therefore, pursuant to California
arbitration law. Id.
101
Id. at 470-71.
102
Id. at 471 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982)).
103
Id. at 478.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 478-79. The Volt decision is based both on freedom-of-contract principles as
well as pre-emption principles, the latter of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
98
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agreement “would [have been] quite inimical to the FAA’s primary
purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms.”106 Arbitration “is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit.”107 Thus, the Court enforced the parties’
choice-of-law provision which did not conflict with the terms or the
policies of the FAA.108 While the holding in Volt allowed the parties to
litigate their claim pursuant to their arbitration agreement, because the
California law was not diametrically opposed to arbitration, the
intentions of the parties—as evidenced through their contract—was
upheld.
Six years after the Court decided Volt, it considered whether an
arbitration agreement contained in an agreement for the purchase of
securities properly permitted an arbitrator to award punitive damages
against defendant Shearson Lehman Hutton (“Shearson”).109 The
arbitration agreement expressly provided it “shall be governed by the
laws of the State of New York”; however, New York law only permitted
courts, not arbitrators, to award punitive damages.110 Shearson
successfully petitioned the New York state courts to vacate the award
based on the award of punitive damages,111 but the Supreme Court
reversed.112
Although the Court reversed, it recognized: “We have previously
held that the FAA’s proarbitration policy does not operate without regard
to the wishes of the contracting parties.”113 Where in Volt, the Court
determined the choice-of-law provision was a clear statement of the
parties’ intent, in Mastrobuono, the Court determined the “choice-of-law
provision, when viewed in isolation, may reasonably be read as merely a
substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis that otherwise would
106
Id. at 479; see also Koptsiovsky, supra note 43, at 617-18 (“Freedom of contract
notions formed the entire basis for the holding.”).
Because the choice-of-law provision in the arbitration agreement essentially
required the parties to litigate certain issues under California law, “the Court effectively
treated the FAA as a default statute for situations when parties have failed to negotiate a
clause governing a specific issue, such as choice-of-law.” Koptsiovsky, supra note 43, at
617.
107
Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
108
See Cole, supra note 6, at 1248 n.220 (“The Court cautioned that the enforcement
of the parties’ agreement was appropriate because it effectuated the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties ‘without doing violence to the policies behind the FAA.’”).
109
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995).
110
Id. at 53.
111
Id. at 54-55.
112
Id. at 55.
113
Id. at 57 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
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determine what law to apply to disputes arising out of the contractual
relationship.”114 If read in this manner, the Court indicated the limitation
on punitive damages would be preempted by the FAA.115 The Court
continued to note that even if the choice-of-law provision was read more
broadly, the punitive damages award would still stand because the clause
at issue was “not, in itself, an unequivocal exclusion of punitive damages
claims.”116 Thus, the reference to New York law was not sufficient to
incorporate the prohibition on the inclusion of punitive damages in
arbitral awards.
The Court further determined that the parties did not intend to
prohibit the possible award of punitive damages because a reading of the
arbitration agreement, as a whole, evidences the possibility punitive
damages could be awarded.117 “At most, the choice-of-law clause
introduces an ambiguity into an arbitration agreement that would
otherwise allow punitive damages awards[,]” and, under Volt and other
Supreme Court precedent, the “ambiguities as to the scope of the
arbitration clause itself [must be] resolved in favor of arbitration.”118 In
considering the parties’ intent, the Court stated:
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were
actually aware of New York’s bifurcated approach to punitive
damages, or that they had any idea that by signing a standardform agreement to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an
important substantive right. In the face of such doubt, we are
unwilling to impute this intent to petitioners.119

While in Volt, the choice-of-law provision evidenced the parties’ intent
to follow the California procedural rules regarding arbitration, in
Mastrobouno, the same type of provision was insufficient to incorporate
New York law prohibiting an arbitrator from issuing an award containing
punitive damages.120 Against this backdrop, the circuit courts have
114

Id. at 59.
Id.
116
Id. at 60.
117
Id. at 61. The arbitration at issue was conducted pursuant to National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules. Those rules specifically state: “The issue of punitive
damages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are
informed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy.” Id.
118
Id. at 62 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)).
119
Id. at 63.
120
Melissa Brockett, Comment, Party Autonomy and Freedom of Contract in
Securities Arbitration: The Dangers of Expanding Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 2
J. AM. ARB. 77, 85 (2003) (noting the holding in Mastrobuono is that “the choice of law
provision governed only the substantive rights of the parties, not the authority of the
arbitrator”).
115
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attempted to determine whether parties can contract for greater judicial
review, either through a choice-of-law provision or more explicitly.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON EXPANDED REVIEW
Of the eight circuits examining the issue of whether parties can
contract around the FAA to expand judicial review, four have held the
parties may do so while four decided the opposite. Despite the split, there
is no indication whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to settle
the controversy.121 The circuits that have decided that parties can contract
around the FAA to increase judicial review have largely done so on the
basis of freedom of contract, determining the federal law is simply a set
of default rules.122 Conversely, the circuits holding judicial review cannot
be proscribed by the parties have so held on one of two bases. First, some
courts have determined private parties do not have the authority to
dictate to the Article III courts the standard of review to apply.123 In
many ways, this argument is one of judicial sovereignty and
independence. Second, at least one circuit has decided the issue on the
theory that parties cannot create federal jurisdiction by simply
contracting for greater review. This argument rests less on judicial
independence and more on statutory construction and the limited
jurisdiction of Article III courts.
A. Expanded Review is Simply a Matter of Contract
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to decide
this issue. In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp.,124 the court was asked to honor a clause in an arbitration
agreement stating that the decision of the arbitrator “shall be final and
binding on both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to
appeal.”125 The Fifth Circuit determined the “contractual modification is
acceptable because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is
a creature of contract and the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy does not
121

In January 2004, the Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari in
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004). The most recent circuit court decision on
the issue was handed down in October 2005. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Phone
Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005). At this time, it is unclear whether the losing
party will seek review by the Supreme Court. See also Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at
155 (noting the uncertainty and tension on this issue due to the “silence of the Supreme
Court, coupled with the inconsistent lower court decisions”).
122
See infra Section V.A.
123
See infra Section V.B.1.
124
64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
125
Id. at 996.

2006]

Be More Specific!

415

operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties.”126 In
holding the parties could displace the review provisions of the FAA, the
Fifth Circuit essentially treated the federal statute as nothing greater than
a default rule.127 Because the district court failed to apply the parties’
standard of review, the Fifth Circuit reversed and analyzed the award to
determine if the arbitrator made any “errors of law.”128
Not only will the Fifth Circuit enforce a party-created standard of
judicial review but also it will scrutinize both the arbitration agreement
and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the parties
actually contracted for greater review than available under the FAA. In
Prescott v. Northlake Christian School,129 the employment contract at
issue provided for arbitration and contained a general choice-of-law
provision, but no specific provisions regarding the exact standard of
review to be applied on appeal.130 In a handwritten additional paragraph,
the parties agreed no “party waives appeal rights, if any, by signing this
[arbitration] agreement.”131 In light of the fact the contract also provided
that the reviewing court should examine the record evidence and that one
party paid to have a court reporter transcribe the arbitration hearing, the
Fifth Circuit determined some evidence existed showing the parties
intended to contract for expanded judicial review.132 However, because
the court found the review provisions ambiguous, it remanded the case
for additional fact-finding into the parties’ intent.133
126
Id. (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 997 (“Because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review,
their contractual provision supplements the FAA’s default standard of review and allows
for de novo review of issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.”). In a footnote,
the Court acknowledged it would be forced to apply the FAA had the contract been silent
on the issue of expanded judicial review. Id. at 997 n.3. The Gateway court, however, did
not address the issue of whether a choice-of-law provision would be sufficient to show
the parties’ intent of expanding judicial review.
128
Id. The Fifth Circuit directly applied Gateway Technologies to Harris v. Parker
College of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2002), because the arbitration at issue in
Harris included the following language: “[t]he Award of the Arbitrator shall be binding
on the parties hereto, although each party shall retain his right to appeal any questions of
law, and judgment may be entered thereon in any court having jurisdiction.” Id. at 793.
129
369 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004).
130
Id. at 497.
131
Id. The district court interpreted this phrase as meaning the appeal rights the
parties already had, rather than determining this paragraph expanded judicial review.
132
Id. at 497-98.
133
Id. at 498. On remand, the district court affirmed its position and held the parties
only contracted to retain the appeal rights they already possessed under the applicable
law. Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., No. 01-475, 2004 WL 2434997, at *5 (E.D. La.
Oct. 29, 2004). The Fifth Circuit later held the district court did not clearly err in making
this determination. Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 141 F. App’x 263, 268 (5th Cir.
2005).
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In an unpublished table decision in 1997, the Fourth Circuit cited
Gateway and followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit in upholding partydictated expanded standards of judicial review.134 In Syncor International
Corp. v. McLeland, the arbitration agreement between the parties
provided that the “arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of
law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by
judicial review for any such error.”135 The Fourth Circuit was persuaded
by the Gateway discussion regarding the freedom of contract, and it held
the district court below erred in not reviewing the legal conclusions of
the arbitrator under a de novo standard of review.136 The Fourth Circuit,
however, has never cited this case as precedent and has never revisited
this issue.
In 2001, the Third Circuit joined the Fifth and the Fourth
Circuits,137 holding private parties may contract for greater judicial
review than allowed under the FAA. In Roadway Package System, Inc. v.
Kayser,138 the parties entered into an arbitration agreement containing a
generic choice-of-law provision incorporating the laws of the state of
Pennsylvania.139 As an initial matter, the Third Circuit held it would now
“join with the great weight of authority and hold that parties may opt out
of the FAA’s off-the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own
(including by referencing state law standards).”140 Once the court made
this ruling, it turned to decide the “truly difficult question” of whether
the parties had actually contracted for expanded judicial review.141
Although Roadway Package was decided under federal law and did
not turn on a conflicts-of-law analysis, the presence of the choice-of-law
provision in the contract was important in trying to determine the parties’

134

Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1997).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
At the time the Third Circuit decided the issue, the Ninth Circuit, too, had
determined parties could contractually expand judicial review of arbitration awards. See
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter
LaPine] (noting the Ninth Circuit “fully agree[d] with the Fifth Circuit”). This decision,
however, was overruled when the case was reheard en banc in 2003. Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
[hereinafter Kyocera] (stating the Ninth Circuit “agree[d] with the Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits that private parties have no power to determine the rules by which federal
courts proceed, especially when Congress has explicitly prescribed those standards”). The
Ninth Circuit decisions will be discussed in more detail infra in Section V.B.2.
138
257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
139
Id. at 290.
140
Id. at 293.
141
Id.
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intent.142 In analyzing the parties’ intent as evidenced by the choice-oflaw provision, the Third Circuit relied heavily on Mastrobuono. Just as
the Supreme Court held in Mastrobuono, the Third Circuit decided the
mere choice-of-law provision in the arbitration agreement “evidence[d]
no clear intent to displace the FAA’s default standards for judicial review
and to replace them with those borrowed from Pennsylvania law.”143 In
relying on Mastrobuono, the court needed to distinguish the situation at
hand from the facts in Volt. It stated, “We do not view Volt as offering
guidance as to how generic choice-of-law clauses should be interpreted;
rather the Court [in Volt] merely followed its obligation to defer to the
state court constructions of private agreements in cases where no federal
rights are at stake.”144 Furthermore, it joined six other circuits in
concluding “Volt is inapposite when a federal court is constrained by the
need to defer to state court constructions.”145
The Third Circuit bolstered its holding “that a generic choice-oflaw clause, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that
contracting parties intended to opt out of the FAA’s default standards”
with three policy reasons.146 The first reason is to “minimize the
frequency with which parties will be found to have opted out of the
FAA’s default regime when they did not intend to do so.”147 Second,
requiring a showing of clear intent to opt-out of the FAA’s standards
should simplify the proceedings for both the arbitrators and the courts.148
Finally, this rule would not add significant transactional costs for those
parties who truly do wish to be bound by standards other than those
articulated in the FAA.149 Thus the Third Circuit determined it would
142

Id. at 294 (“The only reason we must decide whether to apply federal or state
standards in this case is because the FAA permits parties to ‘specify by contract the rules
under which . . . arbitration will be conducted.’”) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of
Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
143
Id. at 295.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 296.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 296-97. The court noted that to hold otherwise would impose two burdens:
“(1) it would make cases harder to decide for both arbitrators and judges; and (2) the
resulting legal uncertainty might deter settlements.” Id. at 297. Although this opinion
stresses the need to clearly indicate an intent to opt-out of the FAA’s default rules, the
court noted the case might have been decided differently had the “contractual language or
other evidence suggested that the parties intended to be bound by standards borrowed
from state law.” Id. at 297 n.5 (emphasis added). Thus, extrinsic evidence could be used
to show the parties’ intent; however, it is unclear whether the Third Circuit would follow
the lead of the Fifth Circuit and begin remanding cases for additional fact-finding to
determine the exact circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement.
149
Id. at 297.
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allow for contractually-expanded judicial review, provided the parties
specifically contracted for such review.
Most recently, the First Circuit in Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v.
U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp.150 determined parties could contract for
greater judicial review than is provided in the FAA. As in Roadway
Package, Puerto Rico Telephone Company involved an arbitration
agreement with a generic choice-of-law provision.151 The First Circuit
also relied on Mastrobuono, citing it for the following proposition: “In
other words, a choice-of-law clause, standing alone, generally will not be
interpreted to require the application of state law restricting the authority
of arbitrators.”152 With respect to Volt, the First Circuit examined the fact
that the stay provision in California law was not necessarily inconsistent
with the stay provision in the FAA, thus “Volt establishes that application
of state law rules is appropriate only when there is no conflicting federal
policy.”153 Overall, the First Circuit determined that “this case is closer to
Mastrobuono than to Volt, because here, the polices of the FAA are
implicated.”154 Thus, relying on this Supreme Court precedent, the First
Circuit joined the holding of “every circuit that has considered the
question” and held “the mere inclusion of a choice-of-law clause within
the arbitration agreement is insufficient to indicate the parties’ intent to
contract for the application of state law concerning judicial review of
awards.”155
While perhaps unnecessary under the circumstances, the First
Circuit additionally considered the question of whether parties could
contract for expanded judicial review. After reviewing the arguments on
both sides of the issue, the court determined “parties can by contract
displace the FAA standard of review, but that displacement can be
achieved only by clear contractual language.”156 This standard preserves
150

427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 26. The contract provided it would be “governed by and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” Id.
152
Id. at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
Id. at 28-29. In order to distinguish between Volt and Mastrobuono, the Third
Circuit must read the limitations on punitive damages as being a special rule “limiting the
authority” of the arbitrator and, thus, a provision which would have otherwise been
preempted by the FAA. See id. at 28. On the other hand, nothing in the FAA speaks to the
availability of punitive damages, so the New York law could arguably have been read
consistently with the FAA.
154
Id. at 29. Following the reasoning above, once the court characterizes
Mastrobuono as a case involving a conflict between state and federal public policy, this
becomes an easy case. Unlike the punitive damages issue involved in Mastrobuono, the
issue in Puerto Rico Telephone deals with judicial review, an issue explicitly covered by
the FAA.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 31.
151
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the parties’ right to contract for standards other than those provided in
the FAA without overly burdening arbitrators and courts who will have
to decide the parties’ intent.157
Thus, the courts allowing greater judicial review rely heavily on the
characterization of the FAA as default rules and on the right for parties to
dictate in their agreements to arbitrate the procedures under which the
arbitration will occur. By not allowing generic choice-of-law clauses to
supplant the FAA’s review procedures, these courts are ensuring only
parties who actually want a greater judicial review would receive it.
Additionally, the courts presume sophisticated repeat players are the
most likely to negotiate for and take advantage of the opportunity for
increased judicial review.158 These circuits value party autonomy,
provided the parties express their intent clearly.
B. Expanded Review Cannot Be Enforced
Two circuits have explicitly held parties cannot contractually create
judicial review greater than that provided in the FAA.159 Two other
circuits have expressed doubt as to whether parties could contract for
greater judicial review, but they have reserved for another day the right
to answer the question definitively.160 Unlike the decisions allowing
contractually expanded judicial review, the courts deciding the opposite
have relied on different principles in determining that parties have no
right to displace the FAA with their own standards. While the Tenth
Circuit decided the case on the grounds of judicial independence and the
policies of the FAA, the Ninth Circuit based its ruling on judicial
independence and jurisdictional grounds.
The Tenth Circuit, in 2001, was the first federal appellate court to
explicitly rule that parties cannot contract for more judicial review than
the FAA already provides. In Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline, Co.,161 the
parties at issue arbitrated an environmental dispute concerning a
potential oil leak into a creek on Bowen’s property.162 To conduct the
157

Unlike the Fifth and Third Circuits, the First Circuit did not address the types of
evidence or the amount of evidence needed to sufficiently prove the parties’ intent. The
opinion, however, by its reference to “clear contractual language” casts doubt on whether
any extrinsic evidence could be used to prove the parties intended on utilizing a standard
other than the one set forth in the FAA.
158
See supra note 74-77 and accompanying text for a discussion on whether repeat or
one-shot players are actually better served through expanded judicial review.
159
The Ninth and the Tenth Circuits have so held.
160
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have not explicitly decided the issue.
161
254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
162
Id. at 928. Interestingly, the arbitration agreement was contained in a 1918 rightof-way agreement, which was later ratified by a 1943 agreement. Id. at 928 n.1.
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arbitration, the parties agreed to use the Rules for Non Administered
Arbitration of Business Disputes, but included in their agreement a
clause purporting to expand judicial review and have the right to appeal
“on the grounds that the award is not supported by evidence.”163 After
the panel awarded damages to Bowen, he moved to have the award
confirmed in district court.164 Amoco opposed confirmation and sought
judicial review under the contract.165 The district court, however, refused
to apply the expanded judicial review and upheld the award under the
FAA.166
In discussing the judicial review of arbitration awards, the court
stated, “Mindful of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, a court
may grant a motion to vacate an arbitration award only in the limited
circumstances provided in § 10 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10, or in
accordance with a few judicially created exceptions.”167 The Bowen court
acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit—at the time—
had allowed expanded judicial review on the basis of “ensuring that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”168
It also noted “the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
Congress’s intent in enacting the FAA was to ensure judicial
enforcement of private arbitration agreements,”169 and part of that
enforcement includes allowing parties “to conduct arbitration under
procedural rules different from the FAA.”170
However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the conclusion reached
by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits “that the Supreme Court precedent
emphasizing the FAA’s primary purpose compels enforcement of
contractual modifications of judicial review.”171 Indeed, the court held no
Supreme Court precedent should be read to allow parties to “interfere

163

Id. at 930.
Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (regarding procedures for confirmation of arbitral
awards).
165
Bowen, 254 F.3d 930.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 932. The court went on to list the four statutory grounds for vacatur and
noted that the Tenth Circuit allows review for “manifest disregard of the law,” which is
defined as “willful inattentiveness to governing law.” Id. (quoting ARW Exploration
Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1995)).
168
Id. at 933 (quoting LaPine, 130 F.3d 844, 888 (9th Cir. 1997)).
169
Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Mutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995)).
170
Id. at 934 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989)).
171
Id. The court suggested that parties who wanted additional judicial review of their
arbitration awards should simply contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the
award before the award is challenged in a federal district court under the FAA.
164
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with the judicial process.”172 The court then interpreted Volt as treating
the FAA as a set of default rules which could be displaced, provided the
rule supplanted conforms with the overall policies of the Arbitration
Act.173 Unlike Volt, the Tenth Circuit determined that contracting for
expanded judicial review was contrary to the purposes of the FAA,
namely the “legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring
arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration process.”174
As a practical matter, the Tenth Circuit was concerned it would be
required to judicially review arbitration awards under unfamiliar
standards, if the parties so desired.175 Additionally, because “parties may
not force reviewing courts to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures,”
contracting for a standard of review other than that provided in the FAA
would “threaten the independence of arbitration and weaken the
distinction between arbitration and adjudication.”176
The Tenth Circuit, in holding parties may not contract for a broader
standard of judicial review, appears to rule in this manner for a variety of
reasons. The foremost reason for this outcome is to uphold the policies of
the FAA.177 The court was also concerned about the ability of parties to

172

Id.
Id. at 935.
174
Id. In this regard, the court stated:
Contractually expanded standards, particularly those that allow for factual
review, clearly threaten to undermine the independence of the arbitration
process and dilute the finality of arbitration awards because, in order for
arbitration awards to be effective, courts must not only enforce the
agreements to arbitrate but also enforce the resulting arbitration awards.
Id. Some commentators debate whether Volt actually supports the view taken by the
Tenth Circuit. See Moses, supra note 68, at 436 (noting the policies of the FAA “appear
to support expanded judicial review as the parties’ choice, and would seem to be
undermined by a refusal to enforce the parties’ agreement. Thus, there does not appear to
be support in Volt for the Tenth Circuit’s position”).
175
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935-36. Practically speaking, the court stated “expanded
judicial review would require arbitrators to issue written opinions with conclusions of law
and findings of fact, further sacrificing the simplicity, expediency, and cost-effectiveness
of arbitration.” Id. at 936 n.7. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion on the drawbacks of requiring written opinions in arbitration. Additionally,
rather “than providing a single instance of dispute resolution with limited review,
arbitration would become yet another step on the ladder of litigation.” Bowen, 254 F.3d
at 936 n.7. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of arbitration
incorporating aspects of litigation.
176
Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936.
177
See Enkishev, supra note 88, at 84 (“According to the Tenth Circuit, an arbitration
agreement calling for an expanded judicial review of arbitration would threaten and
undermine the policies of the FAA.”). Thus, the policies of efficiency, speed, and costsavings would all be jeopardized if the parties could contract around the provisions
ensuring finality of arbitration awards.
173
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utilize unfamiliar standards of review.178 Although never directly stated
in the opinion, the court appears concerned about private parties
interfering with the sovereignty of the courts and telling them how to do
their job. In other words, party empowerment does not extend so far as to
infringe on the realm of the courts.179
Originally, the Ninth Circuit held parties could contract for
expanded judicial review.180 However, the court revisited this issue en
banc and reversed its prior ruling.181 In so doing, the court relied on
many of the same grounds as the Tenth Circuit did in Bowen. For
example, the Kyocera court recognized expanded judicial review would
“well jeopardize the very benefits of arbitration, rendering informal
arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming

178

While all of the cases to date have involved “familiar” standards of review, it is
unclear what any of the courts would do if faced with a strange or unusual standard of
review.
179
See Moses, supra note 68, at 435 (“With regard to party empowerment, the court
rejected any right by parties to dictate to courts the scope of review, noting that parties
may not force reviewing courts to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures.”). In a similar
vein, allowing for expanded judicial review breaks down the distinction between
arbitration and litigation. See Schmitz, supra note 1, at 184 (noting the independence of
the courts “depends on limited judicial review of awards because limited review protects
an arbitrator’s role as the final judge of both law and fact.”).
No judge has made the judicial-sovereignty argument so explicitly as Judge Mayer
in his dissent in LaPine. He stated, “Whether to arbitrate, what to arbitrate, how to
arbitrate, and when to arbitrate are matters that parties may specify contractually.
However, Kyocera cites no authority explicitly empowering litigants to dictate how an
Article III court must review an arbitration decision. Absent this, they may not.” LaPine,
130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
180
The original panel in LaPine supported its view by determining “the primary
purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in
accordance with the agreements’ terms.” LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888. Thus, the court
focused on the language in Volt concerning party autonomy and the freedom to contract.
The court noted that to do otherwise would be to act in a manner hostile to arbitration. Id.
at 889.
Judge Kozinski, writing separately, provided the second vote in this two-to-one
decision. Although he was concerned about the lack of precedent stating “private parties
may tell the federal courts how to conduct their business,” he was sufficiently convinced
the FAA requires parties to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms to
hold in favor of allowing for expanded judicial review. Id. at 891 (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). However, his concurrence was based, in part, on the fact that the parties
contracted for a standard of review already familiar to the courts. Id. He noted, “I would
call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the
award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.” Id.
181
Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“We therefore overrule
LaPine I, affirm the district court’s 1995 conclusion, and hold that a federal court may
only review an arbitral decision on the grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.
Private parties have no power to alter or expand those grounds, and any contractual
provision purporting to do so is, accordingly, legally unenforceable.”).
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process.”182 It also expressed concern about allowing “private parties [to]
dictate how federal courts shall conduct their proceedings.”183
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to distinguish Kyocera from Volt.
It determined Volt stands for the proposition that “parties have complete
freedom” to contract which disputes would be arbitrated, under which
rules they would be arbitrated, and which procedures would best suit the
parties and their particular dispute.184 “Once a case reaches the federal
courts, however, the private arbitration process is complete, and because
Congress has specified standards for confirming an arbitration award,
federal courts must act pursuant to those standards and no others.”185
Additionally, it did not believe Congress, in enacting the FAA, was
giving private parties the “power to dictate how the federal courts
conduct the business of resolving disputes.”186 As with the Bowen
decision, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kyocera echoes the concerns of
judicial sovereignty and independence.
The Kyocera decision also quoted favorably the Seventh Circuit’s
dicta indicating an expansion of judicial review would confer upon the
federal courts jurisdiction they did not previously possess. In Chicago
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,187 the court
stated that parties “cannot contract for judicial review of that [arbitration]
award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”188 The court
determined FAA Sections 10 and 11 are jurisdictional in nature, and any
expansion of judicial review would necessarily create federal jurisdiction
where none existed prior. The Seventh Circuit then recommended parties
contract for an appellate arbitral panel rather than expanded judicial
review.189 The Kyocera opinion also noted the Eighth Circuit, in
favorably reciting Judge Mayer’s dissent in LaPine, would likely hold
182

Id. at 998.
Id. at 999.
184
Id. at 1000.
185
Id.
186
Id. In her article, Moses claims parties who contract for expanded judicial review
are not “trying to dictate to the courts the standard of review,” but “simply asking the
courts to consider, as provided in the parties’ arbitration agreement, whether an arbitrator
erred as to the law, or as to the law and the facts.” Moses, supra note 68, at 442. Indeed,
she argues the courts are conflating the issues of standards of review and grounds for
review. Id. The FAA does not specifically state how the courts should review an arbitral
award, and FAA Sections 10 and 11 merely give reasons for either vacatur or
modification, rather than setting forth the standard under which the courts review for
these grounds.
187
935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
188
Id. at 1505.
189
Id. This idea of contracting for an arbitral appellate panel has been voiced by many
other courts as well. See, e.g., SI V, L.L.C. v. FMC Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063
n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Mariner Fin. Group, Inc. v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 46 (Tex. 2002).
183
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judicial review cannot be expanded by contract if the court has the
opportunity to directly decide the issue.190
Thus, the Ninth Circuit approach draws heavily on the idea that
parties cannot tell the courts how to conduct their review. Indeed, the
language in Kyocera on the theory of judicial independence is often more
strongly worded than in Bowen. Unlike Bowen, the Ninth Circuit
approach is less based on the policies underlying the FAA than on
judicial sovereignty. Additionally, the Kyocera court, by quoting at
length from Chicago Typographical, appears to endorse the theory that
expanded judicial review actually increases the amount of jurisdiction
bestowed upon the federal courts by the FAA.
C. Which is Correct?
Although commentators have written extensively on both sides of
this issue, the approach taken by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits appears to
be more sound than the approach followed in the First, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Circuits. The plain language of the FAA sheds little, if any,
light on the issue.191 The statute does not indicate whether it is meant as a
default or mandatory set of rules.192 Even if some of the rules—such as
those regarding procedures in arbitration—could be classified as default
rules, it is unclear whether the provisions regarding judicial
involvement—such as the enforcement and judicial review provisions—
could ever be waived.193 The legislative history and policies underlying
190
Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 999 (citing UHC Mgmt. Co. v Computer Scis. Corp., 148
F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998)). In UCH Management, the Eighth Circuit recognized it was not
clear “that parties have any say in how a federal court will review an arbitration award
when Congress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a review is
to occur.” 148 F.3d at 997. After discussing the circuit split on the issue, the court noted,
“we do not believe it is yet a foregone conclusion that parties may effectively agree to
compel a federal court to cast aside sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA,” and quoted
extensively from Judge Mayer’s dissent in LaPine. Id. In 2003, the Eighth Circuit praised
the “persuasive reasoning” of Bowen and reiterated its skepticism of the approach taken
by the Fifth and Third Circuits. Schooch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 n.3 (8th
Cir. 2003). However, because the court, again, was not squarely presented with the issue
of the enforceability of contractually expanded judicial review, it reserved for another
day the ultimate disposition of the issue. UCH Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 998.
191
See Goldman, supra note 5, at 182 (describing the statutory language as
“indeterminate” on this issue).
192
In concluding the FAA is a set of default rules to be contracted around, Maggio
and Bales take cues from the legislative history of the FAA providing that contracts to
arbitrate should be enforced as any other contracts and be enforced according to the terms
set forth by the parties. Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 181.
193
While it is unclear why anyone would do so, parties to an arbitration agreement
probably cannot contract around the enforcement provisions of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§
3, 4. To do so would be to prohibit the courts from enforcing the arbitration agreements,
something clearly contrary to the purposes of the FAA.
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the FAA appear to cut in favor of both approaches. On the one hand,
Congress sought to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to the
terms chosen by the parties.194 On the other hand, Congress also intended
arbitration to be a cost-efficient, self-contained procedure resulting in
final and binding awards.195 Thus, depending on which view of
congressional intent a court finds persuasive, it can determine the
policies of the FAA support either side. Thus, the true question is one of
party autonomy versus judicial independence.
Despite language in Volt, judicial independence should prevail.
Nothing in either the FAA or in Supreme Court precedent has ever
suggested parties, in crafting their arbitration agreements, can dictate to
the courts how they do their jobs.196 Volt, too, is distinguishable because
the parties in Volt were not attempting to tell the court what to do. The
parties in Volt were merely contracting for arbitral procedures, including
one that allowed the court to order a stay in the arbitration pending
judicial resolution of collateral litigation.197 The effect of Volt was to
allow the parties to choose between two sets of arbitration procedures,
both of which involved ways in which the judiciary could become
involved in the arbitration. The procedures chosen in Volt did not change
the manner in which the court interacted with the parties.198 In contrast,
contractually expanded judicial review changes the nature of the
interaction between the court and the parties, and no Supreme Court
precedent has even suggested such a change in the relationship between
the courts and the parties is permissible.
Additionally, parties should not be able to tell the judiciary how it
should proceed in reviewing their arbitration award. Although parties
thus far have chosen to expand judicial review using review procedures
familiar to the courts, the day will soon come when the parties ask the
court to review their award under an unfamiliar standard.199 Indeed,
194

See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
196
This is the primary argument of Judge Mayer in the dissent in LaPine. See supra
notes 179 and accompanying text.
197
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476 (1989).
198
See Sullivan, supra note 92, at 555 (“In addition, the FAA was meant to guarantee
the enforcement of arbitration agreements just like other contracts, but it would be
incredulous to think that Congress intended that arbitration agreements could direct a
court how to conduct itself.”). Sullivan also notes the purpose of the FAA is to allow the
parties to contract the process governing their arbitration, not “the substantive issue of
whether vacatur is appropriate.” Id. at 556.
199
For example, the parties could ask the court to review the award to determine if it
is “reasonable,” “rational,” “sound,” or even “good.” It is unclear how the courts would
review an arbitration award under any of these standards.
195
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Judge Kozinski’s worst fears may one day be realized when a reviewing
party asks the court to review their award by examining “the entrails of a
dead fowl.”200 Simply because parties have been sensible in requesting
expanded review does not mean the Article III—or even the state
courts—have to abide by the parties’ wishes. In no other area of law can
the parties dictate to the courts how the courts should proceed to do their
jobs, so it follows that private citizens cannot tell the judiciary how to
review their contracts.
While the Seventh Circuit’s assessment of contractually-expanded
judicial review as involving an impermissible expansion of Article III
jurisdiction is an attractive theory, it is legally flawed. The FAA does not
create federal jurisdiction. It has been described as “an anomaly in the
field of federal jurisdiction because it does not create any independent
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.”201
Because the FAA does not create jurisdiction, it is unclear how parties
could expand the court’s jurisdiction through their agreements to
arbitrate. Despite the flawed reasoning underpinning the jurisdictional
argument, the reasons and policies concerning judicial independence are
sound. The courts benefit by maintaining their authority and employing
familiar procedures. The parties benefit—albeit unwillingly—from the
virtues of finality and effectiveness. And the institution of arbitration
benefits by being a separate procedure distinct from litigation—an
alternative form of dispute resolution.202
VI. CAN MORE CAREFUL DRAFTING CREATE EXPANDED REVIEW?
Determining that parties do not have a right to expand judicial
review, however, may be unsatisfying for parties who truly wish to have
a more searching review of their arbitral award than is currently allowed

200
LaPine, 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring); see also
supra note 180 and accompanying text.
201
Cole, supra note 6, at 1245 n.205 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)); see also Goldman, supra note 5, at 188
(“Quite simply, there is no independent constitutional argument against expanding
judicial review.”); Maggio & Bales, supra note 6, at 161 (“The FAA does not create
independent federal jurisdiction, however, and a federal court may act only when
jurisdiction has been established under Title 28.”).
202
In concluding that the Supreme Court should resolve the question of expanded
judicial review by taking a “middle ground” approach, Longo acknowledges adopting the
position of the Fifth Circuit could lead to “a very real practical concern, namely the
survival of binding arbitration as a meaningful alternative method of dispute resolution.”
Longo, supra note 85, at 1028. He continues by noting the wholesale adoption of the
position of the Tenth Circuit would be “inherently more dangerous” because it rejects the
parties’ right to contract according to their own choosing. Id. at 1029.
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under the FAA.203 As noted by many courts and some commentators, the
parties could simply contract to have an arbitral appellate panel review
the award under any standard the parties see fit.204 This process,
however, may be deemed too cumbersome or expensive for the parties
and an unattractive option.205 How, then, can parties contract for
expanded review? Perhaps they can do so by being more specific in their
arbitration agreements and giving the arbitrator limited powers.
Presumably, if the arbitrators are given strict confines within which to
work, the courts will be forced to examine the arbitration award in the
context of these restrictions.
Thus, parties may be able to achieve the same result as if they had
expanded judicial review, except that by focusing on the rights and
responsibilities of the arbitrator, they will not be impeding on the
independence of the courts. Under this theory, expanded judicial review
would be available in any circuit under the standards already proscribed
by the FAA and the judicially-created grounds for review.
A. The FAA Section 10(a)(4) Theory
As noted above,206 the FAA allows the courts to review arbitration
decisions in order to determine if the arbitrators “exceeded their powers.”
Most often, arbitrators are determined to have exceeded their powers if
they resolve an issue or they have decided an issue not submitted to
them;207 but the statute is not written to so limit its scope.
203

See supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., Dexter Axle Co. v. Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
Dist. 90, Lodge 1315, 418 F.3d 762, 771 (7th Cir. 2005); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,
254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d
992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998); Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d
1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 776
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Ball-Foster Glass Container Co. v. Am. Flint Glassworkers Union, AFLCIO, 354 F. Supp. 2d 839, 845 (N.D. Ind. 2002); William H. Knull, III & Noah D.
Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal
Option, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 550-51 (2000); Sullivan, supra note 92, at 560.
205
Adding a level of appellate arbitral review will add another level of expense to the
proceedings. The parties may not wish to undertake this additional expense, especially if
they are already planning on seeking judicial review of any award and appealing any
adverse judgment made by the district court. Furthermore, the process can become
exceedingly cumbersome if the parties have the ability to choose the arbitrator. Many
parties spend considerable time and effort choosing the person to sit as the original
arbitrator, and with an arbitral appellate system, they would have to choose another one
or possibly three arbitrators to conduct the appellate procedures. The appellate procedure
would, of course, also take additional time, and the parties may rather spend that time in
court rather than in another arbitral procedure.
206
See supra Section II.A.
207
See, e.g., Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Ensearch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574,
578 (3d Cir. 2005).
204
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Perhaps if the arbitrators are given very specific powers, the court
will have to engage in a more searching review to determine if those
powers were, indeed, exceeded. Take, for example, a labor arbitration
over the issues of back-pay and other employment-related benefits.
Assume, too, the agreement to arbitrate specifies a certain formula to
determine the available damages or specifies the base pay under which
back-pay and other income-determinate benefits are determined. If the
arbitrator, who is now constrained in determining the available damages,
decides to award more or less than is allowed under the contract, the
losing party should have a meritorious claim that the arbitrator exceeded
his or her powers in awarding damages by a scale other than that agreed
upon by the parties.208 By specifying acceptable remedies or remedies
calculations, the courts are given concrete bases under which to review
the resulting award.209 In determining if the arbitrator has exceeded his or
her powers in making a remedies calculation, the court will essentially
perform a de novo review of the calculation, even though no party or
court would characterize the review as being done de novo.
In some situations, parties may wish for an arbitrator to solely make
a determination of rights or otherwise rule on an issue without making a
damages determination. In Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite L.L.C.,210 the arbitration agreement specified that the parties
would not be liable to each other for damages under various legal
theories; the arbitrator awarded damages under a legal theory not
specified.211 The Tenth Circuit determined that the arbitration panel did
not exceed its powers under the contract because the panel was “fully
briefed on the issue and it concluded that the provision did not preclude

208

Courts have held in the absence of such restrictive remedy provisions, the
determinations of the arbitrator will likely be upheld as made within the arbitrator’s
discretion. Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Pan Am. Airways Corp., 405 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir.
2005) (quoting Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Office & Prof’l Employees Int’l Union, 203 F.3d 98,
102 (1st Cir. 2000) (“‘Where, as here, the agreement neither requires nor bars particular
remedies, the arbitrator’s discretion is at its zenith.’”)). It is unclear how the First Circuit
would have ruled had the contract at issue stated the pay rate at which the employee
could receive an award of back-pay.
209
By placing strictures on remedies, the arbitration may be characterized as either a
“high low” arbitration or an arbitration involving an acceptable range of damages.
However, parties in a variety of disputes may be benefited in characterizing their
agreements as such. While most employment agreements to arbitrate are generally not
considered agreements to conduct their arbitration under a “high low” system or a system
involving a range of remedies, by making issues such as pay rate a concrete number, the
parties will be better served in obtaining vacatur in the event the arbitrator does not heed
the contractual mandates.
210
430 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2005).
211
Id. at 1277.
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the award of damages.”212 The Dominion Video case, then, could be read
as involving bad drafting. If the parties truly intended on not being liable
to each other for damages, they could have drafted a clause precluding an
award of any damages to either party.213 In other situations, parties could
wish for an arbitrator to make a determination of rights and duties owed
to each other; if so, inserting a clause precluding a damages award would
be beneficial, and review for compliance would be relatively simple.
Furthermore, if the parties wished to arbitrate an issue involving nonmonetary damages, the parties could specify the types of remedies
available and specifically exclude a monetary award from the realm of a
damages calculation. If the arbitrator did not follow the constraints on the
award, the parties could likely make a successful challenge to the award
under Section 10(a)(4).
B. Potential Pitfalls
1. Using Section 10(a)(4) as an “End Around”
Remedies’ specifications are the most concrete and most obvious
way to limit an arbitrator’s power and have the limitations scrutinized on
judicial review. Courts reviewing a clear limitation on remedies should
have little difficulty in determining an arbitrator exceeded his or her
powers by not fashioning an award within the acceptable scope. Whether
other powers, such as the power to dictate an applicable law or burden of
proof, will be scrutinized with such detail is a more difficult question.
In Kyocera, the arbitration agreement specified the arbitrator must
“decide the matters submitted based upon the evidence presented, the
terms of this Agreement . . . and the laws of the State of California.”214
After the court determined the parties could not contractually expand
judicial review, it claimed the arbitrator exceeded his powers by
rendering a “decision premised on unsubstantiated facts or legal
conclusions that constitute errors of California law.”215 The Ninth Circuit
determined the requested review under Section 10(a)(4) was “in reality
simply a recasting” of the previous arguments concerning contractually
expanded judicial review.216 In so holding, the court stated:
212

Id.
On the other hand, the agreement could have reflected the intentions of the parties
at the time, and only later did one party realize it did not benefit from the contract as
written.
214
341 F.3d 987, 1002 (9th Cir. 2003).
215
Id.
216
Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 5, at 181-82 (“The language of [FAA § 10(a)(4)]
should not be so inflexible that the legality of clauses with identical meaning and intent
depends upon how cleverly they are drafted.”).
213
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The risk that arbitrators may construe the governing law
imperfectly in the course of delivering a decision that attempts in
good faith to interpret the relevant law, or may make errors with
respect to the evidence on which they base their rulings, is a risk
that every party to arbitration assumes, and such legal and factual
errors lie far outside the category of conduct embraced by §
10(a)(4).217

Thus, general statements requiring the arbitrator to apply the correct law
in the correct manner are insufficiently specific to confer upon the
arbitrator powers that could be exceeded.218 Indeed, this result seems
correct in light of the fact that courts are already reviewing legal error for
“manifest disregard” and other common-law standards.219 To allow
review under Section 10(a)(4) for simple compliance with the law would
be contrary to the “manifest disregard” standard and, thus, the policies
and purposes underlying the FAA.
Although parties probably cannot rely on a clause requiring an
arbitrator to “follow the law” or even to “follow the law of X State,” a
closer question exists as to whether a detailed statement of the law to
apply could be later reviewed under Section 10(a)(4). Under Kyocera,
the purpose of review under Section 10(a)(4) is to determine if the
arbitrator performed the intended duties under the contract.220 Assume
parties decided to arbitrate an environmental dispute, as in the Bowen
case. If the parties specified a statute or a series of statutes to govern
their dispute, a court may review the arbitrator’s decision to apply a law
other than the one specified. The decision as to whether more searching
review will be applied may turn on how clearly the parties intend the
arbitrator to follow the law referenced.
These same concerns could be expressed over an infinite number of
ways in which the parties could dictate the terms of the arbitration. For
example, the arbitration contract could specify rules of evidence, burdens
of proof, rules of discovery, or any number of other constraints on the
arbitrator. Whether a court will review the arbitrator’s compliance with
these types of rules may depend on how clearly theses duties are
specified in the contract and whether the court can determine the parties
actually intended for the arbitrator to be bound within these strictures.
217

Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1003.
Id. The Ninth Circuit also explained that review under Section 10(a)(4) was
intended to apply “only when arbitrators purport to exercise powers that the parties did
not intend them to possess or otherwise display a manifest disregard for the law.” Id. at
1002-03.
219
See supra Section II.C for a more thorough discussion of the “manifest disregard”
standard and other judicially created standards of review.
220
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
218
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However, the more explicit the provisions in an agreement, the more
likely a court would review the arbitrator’s compliance with the terms
under Section 10(a)(4).221
2. Party Foresight
As a practical matter, parties to an arbitration may not know exactly
how they would like the arbitration to proceed. The parties may not even
know what law they would like to apply or how to craft a meaningful cap
on available damages. If the parties cannot negotiate their contract with
the amount of specificity required to show intent, they may not be able to
take advantage of review under Section 10(a)(4). While some parties are
certainly drawn to arbitration because of the flexibility it embodies and
the discretion it gives the arbitrator, this system’s virtue does not serve a
party’s intention of increasing judicial review through the use of Section
10(a)(4). What is clear is that arbitrators who are given discretion are
almost always found on review to have acted within that discretion.222
Thus, what the parties gain in flexibility they lose in the ability to have
their award reviewed, and vice versa.
As with any contract, the parties must draft it carefully to keep from
creating legal “holes” or other room for discretion. For example, in
Dominion Video, the parties agreed no damages would be awarded to
either party for claims involving third-party liability.223 When the parties
later arbitrated their breach-of-contract claim, the arbitrator awarded
damages, and this holding was upheld on appeal because the arbitration
agreement appeared silent on the issue of a damages award in a breachof-contract claim.224 Perhaps the parties intended to allow damages in
this situation; perhaps they did not. In either event, this case serves as a
teaching tool for parties to be explicit and thorough in their drafting as to
not create discretion by remaining silent on an issue that later becomes
critical.225
221

See 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 2005). The
court noted an arbitrator is bound by the contract as written and is not permitted to
“dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, the
scope of the arbitrator’s authority “generally depends on the intention of the parties, and
is determined by the agreement or submission.” Id. (citation omitted).
222
See supra Section II.C. Indeed, some arbitrators need only keep from acting in a
manner that is “completely irrational.” See also 187 Concourse, 399 F.3d at 526 (noting
an arbitrator need only offer a “barely colorable justification for the outcome reached” to
be upheld on appeal).
223
430 F.3d 1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005).
224
Id.
225
As a final note, the theory that parties can “create” judicial review by explicitly
specifying the arbitrator’s duties quite obviously cannot be used to limit judicial review.
Whether limitations on judicial review are desirable or enforceable is beyond the scope of
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VII. CONCLUSION
By carefully drafting arbitration agreements to specifically define
the powers of the arbitrator, the parties may actually be contracting for
expanded judicial review. For large corporate parties who contract with
entities in many different states, this method of directing the arbitrator to
perform specific duties may serve to expand judicial review even in the
circuits that currently do not allow contractually-expanded review
dictated towards the courts. To be safe, arbitration agreements should
also include a general statement expanding review, but if found
unenforceable, the parties could then rely upon § 10(a)(4) and the
detailed nature of their contract to ensure they receive review of the very
duties the arbitrator was required to follow. Although this theory may not
be adopted by every circuit, placing all burdens on the arbitrator
preserves judicial independence and may make review of the arbitrator’s
actions more palatable to the courts.

this Article. However, expanding judicial review under Section 10(a)(4) does not appear
to have a counterpart that could be used to limit judicial review. Under this Article’s
theory, by giving the arbitrator specific instructions as to how to proceed during the
hearing, the parties can refrain from imposing on the independence of the judiciary and
dictating how the courts should proceed in reviewing an award. Any limitation on judicial
review would necessarily involve telling the courts not to do something. As such, the
theory presented in this Article could not also be used to limit judicial review.

